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In this paper, we demonstrate the application of different sensor location optimization strategies 
in drinking water distribution networks, with aims such as maximization of distribution 
network coverage with redundancy and optimization of contamination source identification. 
We present and compare results of these different approaches applied to hydraulic models of a 
real drinking water distribution network in the Netherlands. The selection of results presented 
in this paper illustrates that it is important for a water company to decide what it wants to get 
out of water quality sensors before installing them in the field. Different optimization criteria 
for their spatial configuration result in very different configurations, which may perform well 
for one purpose but much less so for another. However, some sets of objectives are compatible 
in the sense that a configuration optimized for one objective also performs well for the other. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The most commonly applied strategies for optimal water quality sensor placement in drinking 
water distribution systems are based on the philosophy of contamination early warning systems 
[e.g. 1,2 and references therein]. These strategies aim to minimize the number of people 
affected in case of a deliberate contamination of drinking water in the distribution system, and 
provide a valuable tool. A number of factors which are usually not taken into account, including 
the response strategy to the identification of a contamination event, the fallibility of sensors and 
changes in network configuration (valve manipulation) and operation, may affect the results of 
these strategies. Since the quickness and effectiveness of a response is generally also a function 
of the location of the contamination event (both source and first detection), knowledge on the 
response strategy should also be part of the sensor placement optimization methodology.  
Besides contamination early warning systems, there are several other reasons for placing 
water quality sensors in distribution network, including process control and monitoring, 
regulatory monitoring, etc. These may require a different approach to optimization of the sensor 
network in terms of sensor locations.  
In this paper, we demonstrate the application of different sensor location optimization 
strategies in drinking water distribution networks, with aims such as maximization of 
distribution network coverage with redundancy and optimization of contamination source 
identification. We present and compare results of these different approaches applied to 
hydraulic models of a real drinking water distribution network in the Netherlands. 
 CONTAMINATION SCENARIOS, OPTIMIZATION CRITERIA AND 
APPROACH 
 
Methodology 
A hydraulic model (EPANET-MSX [3]) is used to calculate the transport of contaminants 
through a distribution network. Postprocessing of calculated transport from and to all nodes 
allows a complete consideration of the problems treated here.  
 
Contamination scenarios 
In the network model discussed below, a set of potential contaminant injection points is 
defined, which is a subset which is constructed by optimizing for an equal number of 
connections surrounding each potential injection location. An equal probability of contaminant 
injection is assumed at each potential injection point and at each hour. The same node set is 
used as the set of potential sensor locations.  
 
Optimization objectives 
Detection likelihood and time to first detection 
Mean detection likelihood and mean time to first detection are commonly applied objectives for 
sensor placement optimization, which are included here for comparison. Ostfeld et al. [2] note 
that detection likelihood and time to first detection are criteria which oppose each other in the 
sense of sensor location optimization. However, this assertion is closely related to their choice 
to not include non-detected events in their analysis. When, for example, a large penalty time 
would be given to each non-detected event, a detection time optimized sensor configuration 
would move towards a configuration optimized for detection likelihood. A reasonable choice 
for this penalty time might be the estimated time for a contamination to surface by other means 
(e.g. customer complaints). However, not all events will surface in this way. A different 
approach is to take the maximum residence time of the water in the injection point at the time of 
injection as the penalty time. This approach is followed in this work. 
 
Network Coverage and redundancy 
Network coverage is defined here as the fraction of the network which from which water is 
sampled during a predefined observation window. It is closely related to detection likelihood, 
but allows the user to choose in what way the fraction of the network is expressed, e.g. in 
network length, number of connections, number of connected costumers, etc. Redundancy is 
introduced by demanding concurrent observation of a network segment by at least n sensors. 
Redundancy allows water companies to, for example, start preparatory actions at the first 
detection and escalate when a confirmation from a second sensor is obtained.  
When using a (partially) skeletonized network model, as is the case here, it is important to 
express network coverage in terms of a parameter which is conserved in the skeletonization 
process, such as number of connections, rather than a parameter which is not, such as pipe 
length or volume. 
 
Contamination Source Identifiability 
The most important tool for determining the source area of a contaminant is an accurate 
hydraulic model of the distribution network, in which a contaminant can be traced back in time 
from its point of observation to all the parts of the network where it might have originated. 
Several approaches to this backtracing or backtracking have been presented in the literature 
[e.g. 4,5]. Our approach is based on combination of forward traces. Note that any alternative 
backtracing algorithm which also takes into account the dynamic flow field renders equally 
suitable backtraces for the following. 
 
The backtrace of from a single node in the network forms the complete potential area of origin 
for a contaminant which was observed at this node. This backtrace contains all dynamics and 
variability of the flow field throughout the day. It does, however, not contain the stochastic 
variations in demand and resulting variations in the flow field. These may have a significant 
influence on backtracing in specific parts of the tertiary (reticulation) network (see [6]), but are 
expected not to be important outside these areas. When one assumes that multiple observations 
(in space and/or time) of an anomaly by sensors constitute the same contamination event, their 
combination can be used to narrow down the potential area of origin in the distribution network. 
This becomes a simple exercise when the backtraces are considered in a binary way. For a set 
of observations, the set of nodes which constitutes the potential contamination source area S is 
formed by the intersection of the backtraces of the individual observations Ti for the same 
and/or different sensor locations at the same and/or different observation times: 
 
S = T1  T2  T3  … (1) 
 
The design objective for this optimization objective, contamination source identifiability, is the 
minimization of the mean minimum potential source area size (pipe length) which can be 
determined for the contamination scenario set. This means that for each scenario, the minimum 
non-zero potential source area size is determined (which can occur at any time after the start of 
the contamination event), and the mean for all scenarios is taken as the performance parameter.  
Note that this objective is computationally very expensive. Therefore, the results below have 
been computed for a single contamination time (midnight) at each of the potential source nodes.  
 
Optimization approach 
Optimization is performed using a genetic algorithm implemented in the inspyred library [7]. In 
order to verify the performance of the algorithm, several comparisons against brute force global 
optimizations have been performed for simple networks.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Distribution network 
The approaches describe above are applied to a drinking water distribution network models, see 
Figure 1. It is a skeletonized version of a distribution network in The Netherlands (part of the 
Vitens Innovation Playground [8]).  
 
 Figure 1: Skeletonized distribution system with in and outgoing water flows (red arrows) and 
100 potential contamination/sensor locations (blue circles).  
 
Sensor networks and performance 
Overview 
For all optimization criteria discussed above, optimal sensor configurations have been 
computed for the test network. For all of these optimal configurations, the performance of the 
sensor network with respect to each of these criteria has been determined. The results are 
presented in Table 1, and discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.  A uniformly 
distributed (over the connections) set of 15 sensor locations has been included for comparison. 
It is clear from the table that almost all optimized designs (the exception is design CR3 for 
objective coverage n=1) perform better on each of the individual objectives than the uniformly 
distributed configuration.  
 
Table 1: Overview of sensor network design performances for the objective they were 
optimized for and the other objectives. The uniform configuration is non-optimized. Higher 
performance values are better for the detection likelihood and coverage, lower is better for time 
to first detection and contamination source identifiability (CSI).  
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 DL 0.50 9.22 0.54 0.34 0.26 262 
TFD 0.45 9.13 0.52 0.40 0.22 272 
CR1 0.39 11.80 0.62 0.33 0.21 272 
CR2 0.40 11.11 0.55 0.48 0.29 263 
CR3 0.38 10.28 0.41 0.26 0.31 268 
CSI 0.43 9.67 0.47 0.30 0.16 238 
uniform 0.26 12.48 0.44 0.25 0.11 285 
Detection likelihood and time to first detection 
Optimal sensor locations for 15 sensors with respect to mean detection likelihood and two 
different approaches to the  mean time to first detection are shown in Figure 2. When non-
detections are ignored, i.e. when events that are not observed by any sensor do not contribute in 
a negative way to the performance indicator of the network (cyan circles in Figure 2), a 
configuration with many sensors close to the water sources and transport mains  is found. When 
non-detections contribute a penalty detection time which is equal to the local maximum 
residence time (large magenta circles in Figure 2), a configuration which is much closer to that 
of the maximum detection likelihood configuration  is found, both geometrically and in terms of 
performance for both objectives (see Table 1). This shows that these objectives do not 
necessarily oppose each other, as was noted in [2].  
 
Network coverage and redundancy 
The sensor configurations optimized for coverage in terms of numbers of connections with 15 
sensors and single or multiple (n=2, n=3) redundancy for the test network and their 
performance  are shown in Figure 3. Requiring (multiple) redundancy in the sensor network 
results in a very clear contraction of the configuration and the covered area. 
 
 
Figure 2: Optimal sensor configurations for 15 sensors with optimization for detection 
likelihood (likelihood, blue dots), time to first detection ignoring non-detected events (timing, 
small cyan circles), and time to first detection using the local maximum residence time at the 
contamination site as time penalty in case of non-detection (timing mrt, large magenta circles).  
 
  
 
 Figure 3: Optimal sensor locations for maximum network coverage in terms of numbers of 
connections without (n=1, small blue circles) and with redundancy (n=2, cyan circles, n=3, 
large magenta circles).  
 
Contamination source identification 
The sensor configuration for 15 sensors optimized for contamination source identifiability is 
shown in Figure 4 (blue dots). For comparison, the optimal configuration for the detection 
likelihood objective is also shown (cyan circles). The two configurations are relatively close, 
both in terms of sensor locations and in terms of performance with respect to the different 
objectives.  
 
 
Figure 4: Optimal sensor locations for maximum contamination source identifiability (CSI) and 
detection likelihood.  
The quantitative values of the CSI performance of the different designs listed in Table 1 do 
not appear to be very different. However, these scores are diluted by the assignation of the full 
network as the potential source area in case of non-detection.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Detection likelihood and network coverage appear, at first glance, to be the same parameter. 
However, detection likelihood has a focus on the network, whereas network coverage can be 
defined to have a focus on the consumers. This results in a different configuration, with a 
reduced performance for the other objective.  Requiring redundancy in the network coverage 
may have its clear uses for water companies (for example, it allows water companies phase 
their response to detected contaminants as a function of the number of detections), but 
obviously the number of connections which can be covered with the same number of sensors is 
much lower.  
Minimizing the time to first detection is a very useful approach when one want to protect a 
population. Using the maximum residence time for an individual node as a penalty time when 
optimizing for this objective presents a more balanced approach than ignoring non-detections, 
as has been done in the past. The resulting sensor configuration is quite different, and much 
closer to that for the detection likelihood objective.  
The optimization for contamination source identifiability is a novel criterion, which 
directly connects to mitigative and corrective measures taken in case of a contamination.   This 
criterion results in a qualitatively similar sensor configuration  compared to the detection 
likelihood objective for the case which was studied here.  
This selection of results illustrates that it is important for a water company to decide what it 
wants to get out of water quality sensors before installing them in the field. Different 
optimization criteria for their spatial configuration result in very different configurations, which 
may perform well for one purpose but much less so for another, as is illustrated in Table 1. 
However, some sets of objectives are compatible in the sense that a configuration optimized for 
one objective also performs well for the other. 
Hydraulic models generally play a central role in the optimization of sensor placement. The 
validity of their computations strongly depends upon accurate and up to date information on the 
network, which is often not fully available (e.g. unregistered valve status changes). This is a 
point of concern, which requires attention.  
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